Discursive strategies of “democratic opposition” in Poland in 2019 and 2023: Between delegitimization and bridge-building

Magdalena Solska

Paper abstract:
In 2023, after eight years of right-wing populist rule by the Law and Justice (PiS) government, three opposition forces in Poland successfully regained power. Given the largely unchanged institutional context between the 2019 and 2023 parliamentary elections, this paper examines the strategies opposition parties employed to challenge incumbents. Drawing on an original dataset of 360 political statements made by opposition politicians during both campaigns, the study develops a typology of four strategic approaches: reactive and proactive polarizing, and reactive and proactive depolarizing strategies. The analysis reveals that in both campaigns, opposition parties relied heavily on a reactive polarizing strategy aimed at delegitimizing incumbents through fear-based, disrespect- and blame-oriented rhetoric. In 2023, they complemented this with a proactive, but still polarizing approach, resorting to populist outbidding, policy contrast, and symbolic narrative reclamation to underscore their distinctiveness. The study also showcases that opposition polarizing strategy centered solely on delegitimization of political rivals yields two negative side effects. First, it hinders opposition ability to present a constructive programmatic alternative, and may therefore prove to be self-defeating. Second, it perpetuates and strengthens societal polarization, which is detrimental to democracy.